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Abstract
Libra is a two-level market which assigns fractional shares of time to the transmitting nodes in local
regions of a multi-hop network. In Libra, users are assigned budgets by management and users assign
funding to services within their budget limits. The purpose is to prioritize users and also optimize network
utilization by preventing source nodes from injecting too much traffic into the network and thereby causing
downstream packet loss. All transmitting nodes sell capacity in the region surrounding them, and buy
capacity from their neighbors in order to be able to transmit. Streams buy capacity from each of the nodes
on their paths, thus streams that cross the same region compete directly for the bandwidth in that region.
Prices are adjusted incrementally on both levels.
1 Introduction
We present a market for the scarce local radio chan-
nel capacity in multi-hop ad hoc radio networks. We
call this market Libra, because it dynamically ”bal-
ances” network capacity allocation between compet-
ing users. Libra trades channel capacity on many lev-
els, both on the local, ”regional”, level surrounding
each transmitting node, as well as on the global level
involving multiple regions on the same time. The lat-
ter is necessary to use the channel capacity efficiently
in the presence of multi-hop traffic.
Libra is a two-level market which, at its funda-
mental level, assigns fractional shares of time to the
transmitting nodes in local regions of the multi-hop
network.
The nodes’ shares are computed in a decentralized
fashion, and in a way that enables the stream owners,
or users, to acquire more or less capacity for their
streams simply by increasing or decreasing the money
rate at which they pay for the stream.
In brief the market operates in an iterative fash-
ion, as follows. Money is sent from the users to the
relaying nodes. A relaying node uses the incoming
money to buy transmission time shares from the other
relaying nodes in its local neighborhood. The ac-
quired transmission time share is split between the
streams. Users are informed of the bit rate they
have acquired for their streams, and limit the stream
sources transmission rates accordingly. The users up-
date their spending rates if necessary, and the process
starts over.
1.1 The Problem
In radio networks there are two main types of data
loss, loss caused by the environment (noise), and loss
caused by interfering transmissions. The first type
is adressed by advanced coding techniques, and the
second by coordinating the transmitters. The topic
of this paper is a coordination mechanism to prevent
the second type of loss.
The more transmitting nodes that use a shared,
finite medium, such as a radio frequency band, the
higher risk for collisions. Collisions result in packet-
loss and low throughput. To avoid collisions, nodes in
a region must be prevented from sending too much.
For instance, the sum of the fraction of time each
node transmits, must not exceed one, or there will
absolutely be collisions. I.e. if we have four nodes in
the same region, each sending at thirty percent of the
channel capacity, then we will experience packet loss.
In a single-hop network, collisions can be avoided
with centralized coordination, as is done in GSM net-
works, where the base-station assigns transmission
time slots to the phones.
The situation is more complex in multi-hop net-
works, because a data packet must be sent on a path
through many regions in order to reach its destina-
tion. A packet may be sent through many regions,
but eventually reach a congested region where it gets
dropped, or worse, collides with other packets. This
is called ”downstream packet loss”, and is highly un-
desirable, because all the consumed resources along
its path are now completely wasted. In situations of
extreme downstream loss, the network may be very
busy, without achieving any useful work.
Downstream packet loss can by some amount be
reduced with store/forward. It means that the inter-
mediary nodes store packets in a buffer, and resend
the packet until it has arrived to the next node on
its path. Store/forward is undesirable in resource-
constrained, or low-latency networks, because with-
out any control on incoming traffic, buffers will even-
tually fill up, and with large buffers, packets will
spend a lot of time waiting in buffer queues in the
network.
A better approach is to limit traffic at its source,
i.e. prevent nodes from injecting too much new traf-
fic into the network. But how much should they be
allowed to inject? This is what Libra calculates.
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2 Libra Model
The Libra model consists of six entities: a radio net-
work, transmitting nodes, markets, streams, stream
controllers, and users.
Here we present the entities in a bottom-up order,
which is suitable for a technical understanding, but it
may be advisable to read about them in a top-down
order to get an understanding of how the system ap-
pears to its users.
2.1 Radio Network
Libra relies on an already existing link layer radio
network. The radio network uses a coding technique
such that data loss in a region occurs only when the
transmitters together send more than the channel
capacity. As long as they send less, the data gets
through. This behavior can be achieved for instance
with a frequency hoppning or ultra-wideband radio
link, and error correcting codes.
The above implies that the channel capacity in
a region can be divided into fractional shares, which
can be assigned to the senders in the region, and that
if the senders do not send more than their share, there
will not be packet loss caused by collision. Also, be-
cause Libra delegates the local coordination to the
physical radio network layer, Libra essentially trades
shares of the transmission time, without specifying
when the sender should transmit.
Libra further assumes that the network is able to
route packets on multi-hop paths from a source to a
destination node, either using routing tables or via
an explicitly requested path, so called source rout-
ing. The routing paths should be fairly stable, or the
routing layer should be able to alert Libra about up-
coming re-routing events (similar to hand-over events
in GSM).
In this paper, we consider the network to use the
same transmission rate on all links, because it gives a
conceptually simpler meaning to capacity shares, but
it is also possible to use heterogeneous nodes with
different channel capacities.
2.2 Transmitting Nodes
The radio network used by Libra is built out of re-
laying nodes that both transmit and receive packets.
A node has a set of neighboring nodes that it can
hear, and a set of neighbors it can disturb, by which
it is ment that a node m can disturb a node n if n
can hear m. These sets are not necessarily identical,
because of differences in transmitting power, signal
propagation, etc.
The term ”region” around a node, which we used
informally above, is the set of nodes that it may dis-
turb.
Each node hosts a market that trades capacity
shares in its region. A node that want to transmit,
buys capacity shares on each of the markets in its
region. To prevent packet loss, the node may not
transmit more than what it is allowed by the smallest
share it gets.
The node gets its money from the streams (see
below) that traverse the node. It uses that money in
the node markets to get as much capacity as possible.
It is continuously adjusting how much it buys in the
different markets so as to maximize the smallest share
it gets.
2.3 Streams
A stream is an established path through the net-
work, with a budget and desired bit rate. Streams
have unique identifiers, and packets belonging to the
stream have the stream id written into the packet
headers. A stream starts in a source node, goes via a
set of relay nodes, and ends at a destination node.
Each stream has a local money account and a local
spending rate in each node that transmits its packets.
The stream’s spending rate on a node determines the
stream’s share of the node’s total transmission time.
A node gets its money by taking money from the
local accounts, at the spending rate of those accounts.
The total incoming money is used by the node to ac-
quire capacity from the neighboring nodes it disturbs.
The resulting capacity is then divided between the
streams proportionally to their local spending rates.
Thus each stream has a specific capacity at each node.
An iterative process initiated by the stream’s con-
troller works towards getting the same capacity in all
its nodes, thus maximizing throughput.
2.4 Libra Markets
The markets in Libra are implemented implicitly by
the price and bid announcements made by the par-
ticipants. There are markets at two levels, the node
level, and the stream level.
On the node level, each node has a market at
which it sells ”the right to disturb it”. This implic-
itly coordinates the transmitters in its region so that
they will not cause packet collisions in its region.
The node level market is implemented as a broad-
cast message called price(), which each node sends
out once every second to the nodes in its region.
This message contains the bids, expressed as a spend-
ing rate, that it sends to its neighbors, and its price,
which is the sum of the bids coming in to the node
itself. The node keeps track of all bids coming in to
it, and updates them when it hears a broadcast from
one of its neighbors.
The share a node gets from another node equals
its proportional or ”fair share”, i.e. its bid divided by
the price on that node. To decide its bid, it computes
the bid that maximizes the smallest share it gets on
any of its neighbors. The optimal bid can be solved
with the Lagrange multiplier method, and it turns
out that the optimal bidding strategy for a node is to
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distribute its money proportionally to how much the
other nodes spend there, i.e. proportionally to the
node’s price minus the node’s previous bid.
On the stream level, each node hosts a market
where it resells the capacity it acquired on the node
level market. A stream gets a share of a node’s share
that is proportional to the stream’s spending rate on
that node. Every second, fund() messages are sent
out along the streams, and they contain a desired bit
rate. Thus, a stream that requests a bit rate r should
bid enough that its bid divided by the sum of all bids
gives it its desired rate. This will naturally change
the allocation to the other streams, but their shares
will be re-adjusted by the same process.
The node deducts money from the fund() mes-
sage and puts them in the stream’s money account,
so that it’s balance is enough to cover two funding
intervals, to avoid out-of-money problems at the end
of the funding period.
2.4.1 Market-Based Resource Allocation
With Libra, prices that change all the time, which
causes resource allocations to fluctuate over time. It
may be seen as an inconvenience, but the reason is
that dynamic prices leads to a more efficient resource
allocation. Even though it is convenient for some
purposes, fixed prices and static reservations prevent
a system from adapting to changing demand.
With dynamic prices, scarce resources cost more,
and plentiful resources cost less. This clearly conveys
the fact that buying/allocating scarce resources will
prevent others from doing useful work. A user that
strives to minimize its cost will also automatically
minimize its negative impact on other users.
Market-based resource allocation is useful not
only in non-cooperative systems, but also in coop-
erative systems, such as within an organization. It
simplifies delegation of control, and encourages de-
centralized decision making. Higher level manage-
ment assigns resource budgets to its lower levels, and
the lower levels make local resource decisions.
2.5 Stream Controllers
Stream controllers are control loops that are run at
the source of a stream. The controllers try to esti-
mate the maximum bit rate they can buy for a spe-
cific stream, at a certain spending rate. The stream
controller starts out with a guessed bit rate. It sends
out money to the nodes along the stream with fund()
messages, requesting the guessed bit rate. When the
message reaches the destination node, it is returned
to the stream controller. If the stream controller
gets back more money than expected, it adjusts its
guessed bit rate upwards, and if it gets back less
money than expected, the guess is adjusted down-
wards.
The exact details of how big the adjustments
should be are a topic for our future research. To
large adjustments create oscillations, while too small
adjustments cause slow convergence. However, our
very simple controllers show that convergence hap-
pens even for quite dynamic scenarios.
2.6 Users
Users are the entities that create streams. Each user
is located in one of the transmitting nodes, which
serves as the source (or destination) of its streams.
Users run applications that require data transfers
through the network. A user has a budget which is
set by upper level management, and the user should
use those money to acquire bandwidth for its streams
in order to maximize the perceived quality of service.
The user informs the stream controller of its de-
sired quality of service by setting a spending rate
(currency per second), and not by specifying of a bit
rate, which is the traditional approach. The spending
rate buys the user some actual bit rate, and the user
has to decide whether the current bit rate provides
sufficient quality, or whether to pay more, by reallo-
cate funds from other streams to the current stream.
We prefer the idea of allocating money to streams
to that of setting hard quality of service constraints,
even though they are essentially functionally equiv-
alent. A simple focus on the bit rate obscures the
fact that capacity is allocated at someone else’s ex-
pense, while the use of spending rates highlights the
fact that there is a cost involved for someone else.
2.7 Management
In Libra, money is a tool for specifying priorities be-
tween entities on the same level. Entities on the same
level compete for resources, but their relative prior-
ities are determined by the funding they get from
higher levels.
One particular advantage of market-based re-
source allocation is that it allows higher level man-
agement to delegate detailed decisions to lower levels,
while keeping control on the overall priorities between
different tasks.
Libra users get their money from some higher
level, which is not part of Libra, or of the radio net-
work, but the higher levels are part of the market
that Libra operates on. For instance, in Libra a user
may be a staff person, or even a department, that
gets funded by higher levels of management.
If an entity at one level gets problems which can-
not be solved by reallocating its resources, it will need
more resources, and the problem is treated at the next
upper level as a budget problem. On that level, the
entity manager likewise has to choose whether to re-
allocate money between its lower entities, or whether
to ask for more money from the next higher level.
The use of money as a tool for prioritization has an
unexpected result. Money should be spent optimally,
but entities should not try to save money. Instead,
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they should spend all the money. If they do not,
then higher levels are prevented from using money to
control priorities, for instance by increasing money
allocation to some important user or stream.
2.8 Implementation
Libra uses two kinds of messages, price() and fund()
messages, and a small amount of state in the nodes.
To avoid cluttering the formulas, we assume all fund-
ing intervals to be one second, as extending them is
straight forward.
Each node n keeps track of the spending rate rs,n,
balance bs,n, and last fund time ts,n for stream s on
n. For each node m in n’s region N , n keeps track
of m’s bid xm,n on n, of n’s bid xn,m on m, and the
price pm of m.
Every second, n updates its bids and price
xn,m :=
pm − xn,m∑
k pk − xn,k
∑
s
rs,n, pn :=
∑
m
xm,n
and broadcasts
price(n, pn, {(m,xn,m)|m ∈ N})
n may now send at cn = Cxn,m/pm, where C is the
max link capacity. When a node receives a price mes-
sage price(m, pm, {..., (n, xm,n, ...)}), it updates pm
and xm,n.
When node n, at time t, receives a fund(s, a, gs)
message containing amount a and requesting bit
rate gs, and for which it is not the final destina-
tion, it first deducts money bs,n := bs,n − (t −
ts,n)rs,n. Then it computes the necessary spend-
ing rate rs,n := gs
∑
u ru,n/cn, and updates a :=
a− (2rs,n− bs,n), bs,n := 2rs and ts,n = t. If the node
is the final destination, it forwards the fund message
back to the originating stream controller.
The stream controller for stream s keeps track of
its spending rate rs and its bit rate guess gs. Every
second the stream controller issues fund(s, 2rs, gs)
messages addressed to the destination node of stream
s.
When the controller gets back a fund(., a, .) mes-
sage, it increases gs if a > rs and decreases it oth-
erwise. In our test implementation we multiply (or
divide) bs with 1.01, but a more robust controller,
like a PID regulator should be used.
3 Results
We have tested the Libra model briefly in a simulated
environment, and can here report some qualitative
results. We used a random network topology, created
by adding nodes on a 2d square until the network was
connected.
Figure 1 shows the behavior of the node level mar-
ket, as nodes iteratively update their bids. To max-
imize their minimal share they need to move their
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Figure 1: All nodes have budget=1. A single stream
flows through the network. Note that only a few
nodes get congested, most nodes have price zero.
Prices stabilize quickly after one of the nodes got in-
creased funding at t=40.
money onto nodes where they have a small share, thus
eventually all money are on the few congested nodes.
There is no point in buying capacity upstream if the
streams are saturated downstream. When funding
levels change, the new price level is reached smoothly.
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Figure 2: Stream funding changed every 20 s. On a
short time scale the streams’ shares fluctuate a lot,
because of other streams and nodes adjust their bids.
Figure 2 shows the shares obtained by the nodes.
In this scenario, streams get adjusted funding rate ev-
ery 20s. Node bid updates causes other nodes’ shares
to fluctuate. The fluctuations appear to belong to
different regimes, determined by the price level. At
some price levels, fluctuations can be large, while at
others, the fluctuations are smaller.
Even though the shares fluctuate quite a lot on
the short time scale of the figure, the shares are quite
stable on just a little longer time scales, which means
that it is sufficient with quite small end-point buffers
to negate the fluctuations.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the simple stream
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Figure 3: Active stream controller adapts bit rate
guess with simple minded controller. Prices oscillate
and converge slowly.
controller which changes the bit rate guess for the
streams. Because of the system lag, the prices os-
cillate, but they seem well behaved enough that it
should be feasible to get rid of them with a better
control algorithm.
4 Related Work
The idea to use rate control at the edge of the network
has roots in wireline network. Kelly, et al. [1] pro-
posed an elegant and stable rate control scheme, but,
unlike Libra, it assumes that users have individual
utility functions, which are sufficiently well-behaved.
Qiu, et al. [2] present a price-based allocation
scheme, in which users charge other users a proce
for relaying their packets, using iterative price adap-
tation. Their model therefore models transmitting
power scarcity, rather than link contention.
Rate control at the edge has also been proposed
for ad hoc networks. Curescu et al. [3], and Xue, et
al. [4] build on the work of Kelly, and applies the
ideas to ad hoc networks. Thus they also rely on
utility functions, and use shadow prices to create a
distributed version of an optimization problem. Un-
like Kelly, they use a two-tier market and compute
internal prices in interior sub-cliques in the network.
5 Discussion
The market described in this paper is intended for
a cooperative system with the purpose of provid-
ing a conceptually simple model that provides a fair
resource utilization, and where users have a simple
model of the consequences of their actions, i.e. pay
more to get more.
The nodes that transmit have to be cooperative,
and follow the protocols. This is the case for all radio
protocols, as it is very easy to disturb a radio network.
It is easy to detect non-cooperative nodes in the
network, since they transmit more than their fair
share, which results in higher packet-losses in that
area. Non-cooperative nodes have to be handled out-
side of the protocol (i.e. by sending someone out to
shut down the node physically).
Since we assume the nodes are cooperative, they
do not have to perform extensive book-keeping of
where money goes. The purpose of the bandwidth
market is to get a high and fair network throughput,
which is in the interest of all the users in a coopera-
tive system. It is sufficient that the users keep track
of their spending, and don’t over-spend.
The rules allow the streams’ fund() messages to
have negative balances. This is not assumed to be a
problem, again because of the cooperative nature of
the system. Should it be a problem, the transit nodes
could start shaping the traffic, to prevent someone
from disturbing the system by trying to allocate much
larger shares than can be afforded.
An interesting case for future work is to use the
Libra market prices to guide the building of network
routing tables or source routes. High prices are indi-
cators of network congestion, and therefore the net-
work capacity could be better used if routes were
built to avoid expensive, and thus congested, parts
of the network. One approach would thus be to use
the Libra node prices as the ”distance” in a weighted
distance vector routing protocol.
The work on Libra is funded by SICS Center for
Networked Systems.
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